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SUMMARY
The central task of this study is the description and explanation of regional
dffirences in the length of stay in hospital for a number of frequently
encountered surgical procedrrres in the Netherlands. In the, mainly English-
language, literature on variation in hospital treatment it is implicitly assumed
that the nature and extent of hospital treatment which people receive is
dependent on processes in the region in which they live and in which the
treatment is provided. Is this implicit assumption correct or are there sub-
regional processes that are much more important?
As reported in chapter l, i t turns out that a description of (regional)
differences in length of hospital stay in which differences in state of health
between patients are taken into account and in which the various levels of
analysis - region, hospital, hospital ward and doctor - are crit ically examined
is lacking in the Netherlands.
It also turns out that no serious attempt to explain regional differences on the
basis of the behavior of the actors involved (doctor, patient, hospital
management) could be found in the literature. The theoretical point of
departure of this sfudy is namely that the basis of differences in length of
stay l ies in the behavior of goal-oriented individuals, especially doctors and
patients, whose behavior is influenced by their circumstances. Given these
points of departure, it may well be that the regional level is too high a level
of analysis.
An extensive description of regional differences in the length of
hospitalization for ten surgical procedures in the Netherlands is presented in
chapter 2. The data used were supplied by the VNZ (Vereniging van
Nederlandse Zorgverzekeraars), and are from the years 1982 and 1986. The
extent of regional differences was examined per surgical procedure. Four
procedures - the meniscus extirpation, the squint-correction operation, the
nasal septum operation and the tonsillectomy (16 years and older) - displayed
considerable regional differences in duration of hospitalization. The
differences were noticeably smaller for the other procedures. Following this,
the size of the differences in duration of hospitalization was examined within
regiorn between hospitals.
The outcome of the intra-regional analyses is that the regional differences are
indeed pale and sharply reduced when the hospital is taken as the unit of
analysis. The differences between hospitals within the regions are great. It
was concluded that the causes of differences in length of stay should
therefore not be sought at the regional level - as is usual in much of the
Anglo-saxon literature on the subject - but at a lower level of analysis: the hospital.
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The question was then posed whether the hospital level might not also be too
high a level of analysis. This question was examined by looking at whether
within the same hospital the different surgical procedures, largely performed
on different wards, have systematically short or long durations of
hospitalization. If this is indeed the case, the causes of differences in
duration of stay must be sought at the level of the hospital. If it is not the
case, and short and long durations of stay occur simultaneously within the
same hospital, then the appropriate level of analysis is the hospital ward. The
result of the analysis showed that hospitals with a long average duration of
stay for one specific procedure did not have a systematically long duration of
stay for other procedures. However, for the ward level within hospitals we
did find such a systematic effort. We conclude from this that differences in
length of stay occur at the level of the hospital ward; close to the level of the
individuals involved. Important differences in (work)conditions probably
occur at this level, resulting in differences in length of stay decisions. This is
not to say that circumstances or restrictions at the regional or hospital levels
are unimportant, but that for the construction of a theoretical model, the
ward level forms the better starting point. The explanatory question is thus
adapted and reads as follows:
W does the average length of hospital stay for
procedure-specific groups of patients differ between
hospital wards in the Netherlands and what is the role of
medical specialists and other relevaní acÍors in bringing
about these dffirences?
The theoretical model that is supposed to answer this question is presented in
chapter 3. This chapter begins with an introduction of the method of
theoretical analysis.
In constructing the theoretical model, we focus on three actors: the doctor,
the patient and the hospital management. All three are supposedly involved
in bringing about the (differences in) length of stay. The behavior of the
central decision-maker, the doctor, is modelled stepwise in sections 3.4 to
3.9. The behavior of the hospital management, a collective actor, is not
explicitly modelled but included in the form of restraints on the doctor's
behavior. Initially it is also assumed (for simplicity's sake) that patients have
no influence on the doctor's length-of-stay decision. This assumption is
subsequently relaxed and the possible differences between patients
concerning their influence are specified.
The model-building is based on Lindenberg's theory of social production
functions: people (in this case doctors) pursue two general goals: social
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approval and physical well-being and in order to realize these goals people
choose instrumental goals that are available in their action situations. An
example is the generation of income, which is in our money-economy an
instrument to procure physical well-being. For the specific problem of this
study, the length-of-stay decision of doctors in hospitals, the following two
instrumental goals, among others, are formulated:
l) avoiding criticisrn in order to maintain social approval from colleagues
and patients;
2) generation of income in order to increase physical well-being.
These instrumental goals are, in turn, linked to lower level instrumental
goals or 'production conditions' under which doctors make their decisions
concerning patients' length of hospitalization: the degree of bed shortage, the
doctor's remuneration system, the patient's occupational status. This
stepwise process of theoretical analysis resulted in ten hypotheses, which are
summarized below. In the last two hypotheses the patient is explicitly
included as an actor in the theoretical analyses.
hypothesis 7: in order to avoíd loss of social approval among colleagues, the
individual doctor wíll choose a length of stoy for the patíent which is close to
the local customary procedure-specific length of stay - the local standard.
hypothesis 2: the doctor who works in more than one hospital will, in order
to ovoid loss of social approval, choose a length of stay close to the local
standard of the hospital where he/she is working at the time.
hypothesis 3: if the number of locally available beds is low and the doctor is
paid per procedure, a length of stay will be chosen which is close(r) to the
le ng t h- of-s t ay minimum.
hypothesis 4: if the number of locally available beds is low and the doctor is
on a salary contracÍ for a hospital, a length of stay is chosen which is
further removed (in comparison to lrypothesis 3) from the length-of-stay
minimum. In periods of íncreasing bed shortage, longer average waiting lists
occur for salaried doctors.
hypothesis 5: if the local supply of available beds is plentiful, doctors choose
- regardless of the remuneration system - a length of stay which contributes
to the moximum utilization of the beds, in connection wíth the goal of social
approval. We expect Íhis mechanism to be stronger in 1982 than in l986for
relsons of rule change.
hypothesis 6: as a result of a 'competítionfor beds' between hospítal wards
(within hospitals), it is likely that the supply of available beds wiII dffir
beÍween wards, as a result of which the order of ranking of length of stay of
various surgical procedares performed in different wards is not
systematically the same within the same hospital.
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hypothesis 7: in periods of bed shortage, a shorter length-of-stay minimum(and thus a shorïer actual length of stoy) will be chosen if:
- substitution possíbilities exist for a part of the hospitat stay outside the
hospital providing treatment and/or
- the degree of specialization of the doctor involved is higher and/or
- the level of specialization oÍ the involved hospital's services is higher.
hypothesis 8: in periods of bed shortage, the length of stay in the ward
involved will be longer if:
- the geographical distance between alternative hospitak in which
doctors work and the hospital involved is shorter and/or
- the substitution possibílities for non-clinical procedures within the
are plentiful.
hypothesis 9: given a plentiful supply of available beds, the doctor will
experience the more resistance from the patient to a choice for a longer
duration of stay the longer the length-of-stay minimum for the surgicalprocedure for which the patient was admitted.
hypothesis 10: when there is a plentiful supply of beds available and there ís
a long procedure-specffic length-of-stay minimum, the chance that the patient
will criticize the docÍor's length-of-stoy decision is the greater the higher
his / he r s ocio-cultural and e conomic oc cupational status.
These ten hypotheses are tested in four empirical sfudies, spread over the
next four chapters. Chapter 4 is a 'route description' for the manner in
which the empirical testing is organized.
Hypothesis 10, concerning the influence of the patient on the choice of the
duration of hospitalization, is dealt with first, in chapter 5. This hypothesis
is tested before hypotheses I to 8 because the outcome of the test has
consequences for the other three empirical studies. The analyses in this
chapter reveal that hypothesis 10 could not be confirmed. patients who have
a clear economic motive to negotiate about 'accelerated discharge', and who
are capable of this because of a relatively high level of social assertiveness,
stay in hospital just as long as patients without an economic motive and/ or a
high level of social assertiveness. we concluded from this that our
assumption that the doctor is the central actor in arriving at the length of stay
decision does not need to be adjusted. The analyses in chapter 5 have the
following consequences for the rest of the empirical studies in this book:
l) differences in procedure-specific length of stay are all the more related to
the decision-making behavior of the doctor, and 2) because no differences
were found in procedure-specific length of stay between publicly and




chapter - the generalisabil ity of the results of chapters 2, 6, 7 and 8, which
were based exclusively on patient records of the publicly insured (VNZ), is
not restricted to only publicly insured patients.
Hypothesis 9 could not be empirically tested in this study because of data
restrictions. However chapter 5 does say something about the tenability of
this hypothesis, because hypotheses 9 and 10 are closely related. The
question is: should hypothesis 9 be rejected together with hypothesis 10. Is it
true that, if patients do not differ in their influence on the length of stay,
they have no influence on the length of stay? Clearly one those not follow
from the other. At this stage, we would like to assume the patient's influence
for the explanation of the fact that the procedures requiring a lengthy stay
vary /ess in the length of stay than the procedures requiring a shorter stay.
At some point, the patient's desire to return to their homes will curb the
doctor's desire to keep the patient longer. However, we do not at this stage
have access to the sort of data which would be needed to test this hypothesis.
Hypotheses 1 and 2, concerning the mechanism underlying the doctor's
orientation towards the local standard, were tested in chapter 6. rile
modelled the situation where doctors gear their own medical practice to that
of colleagues within the same hospital organization in order to maintain their
social approval among colleagues. Our prediction was confirmed empirically:
doctors conform to the local length of stay standard and thus to the length of
stay decision of direct colleagues, within their 'own' hospital. The variation
in procedure-specific length of stay choices between doctors within hospitals
is slight (research hypothesis 1). We then subjected the mechanism
'orientation to a local standard' to another empirical test by looking at the
behavior of doctors working in more than one hospital. Hypothesis 2 was
also confirmed: where doctors work in different hospitals with different
(procedure-specific) lengths of stay, inta-doctor variation can be observed,
that is to say that doctors choose a length of stay in the direction of the
standard of the hospital in which they are working at the time.
After showing in chapter 6 that individual doctors within hospitals differ
scarcely or not at all in their length of stay decisions, we show in chapter 7
that the length-of-stay standard differs between hospitals/wards as the
availability of beds varies. Besides the fact that not reducing the length of
stay in the case of a bed shortage has unfavorable effects on the level of
income of doctors who are paid per procedure, the explanatory mechanism
(in the case of a plentiful supply of beds) is once again based on the role of
social approval, but now on the approval gain which depends on jointly
protecting a wards's allotments, which, in turn, means not leaving available
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beds unused.
Hypothesis 315 (a combination of theoretical hypotheses 3 and 5), and
hypotheses 7 and 8 for secondary restrictions, describe and predict this
expectation. we predicted a positive relation: more available hospital beds
means a lengthier stay for patients. on the basis of the research results using
multi-level analysis we conclude:
l) the expected positive relation between the availability of beds - for the
short and long term - and patients' length of stay was confirmed for all
examined surgical procedures, but the effect was weaker than anticipated,
and
2) the prediction concerning the secondary restrictions (hypotheses 7 and 8)
were by and large not confirmed. It is striking that in the case of bed
shortage in the hospital ward the length of stay was not systematically
influenced by internal or external substitution possibilities for a part of the
hospital stay.
Another important result from chapter 7 is that the size of the hospital does
not appear to be related to patients' length of stay: the variation is just as
great in small hospitals as in large hospitals.
Finally, a negative relation was (predicted and) found between the degree of
specialization of the doctor and the length of patients' hospitalization: more
specialized octors choose on average a shorter stay.
In chapter 8 we found empirical support for the (combined) hypothesis 3/4:
salaried doctors choose a longer duration of stay on average in the case of
bed shortage than doctors who are paid per procedure. However, because of
the limitations of the empirical material and the small number of cases, it is
necessary to regard this result with some caution. It is possible that the
relative disinclination of salaried doctors to apply rationing in the case of bed
shortage leads to longer waiting lists, but this is empirically untestable given
the data available for this study.
After a summary, the book closes with a discussion in chapter 9. Firstly,
the gain due to the theory-driven approach in the undertaken sfudy is
discussed. Secondly, we discuss the consequences of the empirical results for
the theoretical model. Thirdly, we conclude that the application of multi-
level analysis, chapter 7, is an appropriate technique to cope with the
problems which arise when hierarchically nested data are used. Finally, some
policy implications and instruments to cope with the 'variation in medical
practice'-phenomenon i  the near future are discussed.
